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in Swaziland 
 





This study examines the nature of the relationship between cane growers and millers 
and how it affects cane growers’ perceptions of the value added in the sugar supply 
chain. Drawing from relational exchange theory, the study utilised the perceptions of 
124 smallholder cane growers in the Swaziland sugar industry. Factors measured in 
terms of a likert type scale were used to measure each relational construct within the 
miller-grower contract relationship. The unpacks the trust relationship between large 
agribusiness companies and smallholder out growers, and shows that relationships 
characterised by social factors like trust, commitment, and cooperation enhance 
mutual benefit and quality relationships between parties.  This study found that 
farmers perceive an element of opportunistic behaviour and a lack of cooperation by 
millers and therefore have limited trust in the millers. Consequently it was also found 
that satisfaction by cane growers on their relationship with millers has a positive 
relationship with their level of trust, level of commitment, relative dependence, 
perception of opportunistic behaviour by millers and perceived cooperation between 
themselves and the millers. The results point to a number of aspects both growers and 
millers need to attend to which could contribute to improved relationship and in turn 
efficiency and returns in the sugar industry in Swaziland.  
1. Introduction 
 
In Swaziland, smallholder sugarcane farmers are contracted to the sugar mills 
to supply them with sugarcane. However, this exchange relationship seems to 
be clouded with problems as farmers perceive unfair distribution of the 
industry’s proceeds by the millers. This is further complicated by the cane 
growers’ misunderstanding of the industry rules and their enforcement. The 
misunderstanding of the rules is manifested when the mills start re-enforcing 
the rules. For example some farmers fail to control diseases because of the high 
costs involved and when the mill rejects their sugarcane, they regard that as 
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unfair treatment. In this typical monopsonistic relationship where a particular 
sugar mill is the only buyer in a region and also determines the proceeds of 
farmers, several potential situations of opportunistic behaviour and mistrust 
can occur.   
 
Despite the importance of the cane growers/millers relationship to the overall 
success of the sugar industry, research on this relationship and how it may 
affect cane growers’ perception of the value of the relationship is limited. The 
purpose of this paper therefore, is to assess the role of relational factors in 
enhancing the perception of cane growers on their relationship with millers.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; Section 2 presents an 
overview of the sugar supply chain in Swaziland, while Section 3 presents the 
theoretical and conceptual framework. The conceptualisation of the grower-
miller relationships is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the data 
collection and methods. The results of the study are discussed in Section 6. 
Lastly, Section 7 provides some conclusions.  
 
 
2. An overview of the sugar industry supply chain in Swaziland 
 
2.1 The Sugar Industry  
The sugar industry, which includes the growing of cane, its processing into 
sugar and its by-products, is of great importance to the Swaziland economy. It 
comprises more than half of the country’s agricultural output, contributes 18% 
of the national output, 16% of private sector wage employment and 11% of the 
national wage employment (Thompson, 2005). Sugar production increased by 
7.8 percent to register 628  191 tonnes during 2003/2004 cropping season 
compared to 583 014 tonnes produced the previous season. This increase was 
partly a result of favourable climatic conditions, high sucrose content and 
expansion of area planted to the crop. Export volumes increased slightly by 1.6 
percent to 284 652 tonnes from 280 174 tonnes exported the previous year. 
After meeting its preferential quota to the European Union, United States of 
America, and sales to the South African Customs Union (SACU) market, the 
industry sold an additional 74 480 and 46 200 tonnes of sugar to the regional 
and the world markets, respectively (Thompson, 2005).  
 
There are three sugar mills in the country, all located in the eastern lowveld, 
and each with a capacity to produce around 160 000 tonnes of sugar per year. 
About 64 percent of the sugar cane is grown by the millers on their own land 
(estates), which is in close proximity to the mills. More than 50 percent of the 
two mills and 40 percent of the third mill are owned by the Government or by Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
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Tibiyo, the national development fund. Three different operating companies 
manage the mills.  
 
The Swaziland Sugar Association (SSA), which was created by the Sugar Act 
of 1967, is an industry organization, which includes all growers and millers. 
The Sugar Act, together with the Sugar Industry Agreement and the 
constitution of the SSA, regulates all aspects of the industry from the right to 
grow cane to how the sugar is marketed. The Act delegates considerable 
authority to the SSA with respect to the implementation of these matters 
(UNCTAD, 2000). The SSA is an association of the cane growers and sugar 
millers which regulates the industry, promotes its interests, and is responsible 
for all processing, conditioning, bagging and marketing beyond the point at 
which raw sugar is produced in the mills. The SSA is controlled by its Council, 
which consists of 12 representatives of growers and 12 representatives of 
millers.  
 




A quota or licence is required to grow sugar cane. The aim of the quota system 
is to ensure that the miller can handle the crop, that the grower has the water 
to grow a disease-free crop, that the grower has the land or right to use the 
land, and that the grower is conversant with the rules of growing cane and the 
relevant legal obligations. It is therefore not a quota to restrict production but 
is basically an agreement between the miller and the grower that the miller 
will take the cane produced and harvested by a grower in a specific harvesting 
window. This is done to optimise the capacity of the sugar mill and to avoid 
the farmers’ product to lose value due to the fact that it is not processed in 
time.  
 
A miller requires a licence to mill cane. This licence is issued by the Minister of 
Enterprise and Employment on the recommendation of the SSA and is 
intended to ensure the long-term viability of the industry and that a sound 
investment study is done before a new mill is licensed. It is worth noting that 
there is no spot market in the industry. Therefore, all the sugarcane from 
farmers is delivered to millers through a contract arrangement in the form of a 
quota as explained earlier. The SSA determines the price paid to both millers 
(for sugar) and the farmers (for cane). 
 
 





All three mills can produce Very High Pol (VHP) sugar at 99.4º pol and raw 
sugar at 98.5º pol. Ubombo and Mhlume mills can also produce refined sugar. 
Simunye has a distillery that produced 12 million litres of alcohol from 48,000 
tonnes of molasses. All sugar processed by the millers remain the property of 
the SSA, and any refining is undertaken on behalf of the SSA for a fee. Based 
on projected demand, the association instructs each mill as to what percentage 
of each type of sugar to produce. All growers are responsible for, and bear the 
costs of delivering their cane to the mill. Once delivered, the cane becomes the 
property and responsibility of the mill.  
 
2.2.3 Marketing 
The SSA markets all Swaziland sugar and by-products, other than by-products 
used by the sugar companies, such as bagasse for firing boilers. The three 
main market areas that are served by the SSA include; ￿SACU (Swaziland, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa); preferential markets (EU and 
United States); and the ￿world market. The proceeds from all sales by the SSA 
are pooled. For the purpose of payment to the mills, each mill's actual output 
is converted to a notional tonnage of 96º pol sugar. Payments to millers and 
growers are based on budget projections of export realisations less SSA costs. 
These projections are revised quarterly and the risk of price fluctuations is 
controlled with borrowings against shipment taken in the currency in which 
the shipment will be paid for. The SSA finances all payments from borrowings 
and does not build up a reserve to finance purchases. Since the 1996/1997 
season the prices paid to millers and growers respectively are based on an 
agreed split. In 2001/2002 season this split was 32.5 percent to the miller and 
67.5 percent to the grower. The amount each farmer is paid depends on the 
amount of sucrose in the cane. The SSA pays the millers weekly for sugar 
produced in the prior week and millers in turn pay the growers for the sucrose 
content of the cane delivered during the previous week  (UNCTAD, 2000). 
 
3. Conceptual framework 
In order to analyse the relationships between cane growers and millers several 
important concepts are relevant and are discussed below. 
 
3.1 Relative dependence and cooperation  
Dependence and cooperation are two extremes of the same continuum, going 
from a desired bilateral investment in the relationship to a constrained 
maintenance of the relationship from one of the two parties regarding the 
difficulty to replace his partner (Emerson, 1962). Total interdependence is Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
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d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  s u m  o f  b o t h  p a r t i e s ’  d e p e n d e n c i e s  o n  e a c h  o t h e r ,  w h i l e  
interdependence asymmetry refers to the difference between each party’s 
dependence on the other. This difference in the level of dependence is referred 
to as relative dependence, which implies the difference in the dependence of 
the farmers on the millers relative to the miller’s dependence on the farmers. 
Emerson (1962) argues that exchange relationships characterised by low levels 
of total interdependence do not require high levels of trust and commitment 
for their functioning since total dependence increases each party’s stake in 
ensuring successful relationship outcome s  r i s e s .   R e l a t i v e  d e p e n d e n c e  m a y  
result from several factors, including lack of alternatives (for the cane growers 
and millers), importance of the sugarcane crop and its availability as well as 
high switching costs. 
 
Cooperation between millers and cane growers is based on balance, harmony, 
equity and mutual support (Oliver, 1990). Cooperation is a bilateral 
management where the two parties involve common investments and 
“coordinated actions” (Anderson and Narus, 1990), voluntarily (Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994) with the objective of making a profit (Smith, et al., 1995). Hence, 
lack of cooperation, can actually cause a problem and create conflict between 
the cane growers and millers. Therefore, perception of cooperation by growers 
is vital in assessing their relationship with millers. It is hypothesised that high 
perception of dependence by both parties will result in h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  
cooperation.  
 
3.2 Trust and opportunism 
Trust is defined as the willingness to rely on an exchange partner whom one 
has confidence (Moorman et, al. 1992). Trust is considered to exist if one party 
believes that the other party is honest or benevolent (Doney and Cannon, 
1997). It is the expectation that attenuates the suspicion that one party in the 
transaction will behave opportunistically (Gulati, 1995). Therefore, if trust 
exists between millers and the cane growers they would be both convinced 
that they will not be victims of behaviour, such as adverse selection, moral 
risk, hold up or any other type of contractual hazard. Therefore the presence 
of trust between exchange partners would reduce the level of uncertainty and 
enable members to be more certain about the future of their relationship. 
Opportunistic behaviour on the other hand refers to lack of honesty in 
transactions. It includes self-seeking with guile. Opportunistic behaviour is 
manifested by one party not delivering promised actions and resources, and 
failing to do it in a fairly systematic way. 




Since trust in a relationship is built up overtime, close continuing relationships 
are vital in generating trust and characteristics such as predictability of 
behaviour in terms of repetitiveness, reliability, competence and credibility are 
also considered important in generating trust in relationships (Wilkinson and 
Young, 1989). Therefore, these characteristics are essential in measuring trust, 
and also help in assessing the degree of trust and the existence of legal 
agreements and the extent to which these are used within the relationship. The 
measurement of trust and its effects on the relationship characteristics and 
development are mostly based on some supposed aggregate value of repeated 
exposure to the exchange, as opposed to potentially differing perception of 
trust the parties may have in their relationship. It is posited therefore, that 
perception of the presence of opportunistic behaviour in the cane growers and 
millers’ relationship will result in reduced level of trust in each other. 
 
3.3 Trust and commitment 
Many studies on industrial buying patterns emphasise the crucial role of trust 
and commitment (see for example, Anderson and Narus, 1990; Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). These two variables are often studied 
together and there is considerable agreement about their combined impact on 
organisational buying behaviour (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Morgan and Hunt 
(1994) argue that the presence of commitment and trust is central to the 
success of relationship marketing, since they encourage suppliers to (1) work 
at preserving relationship investments by cooperating with exchange partners, 
(2) resist attractive short-term alternatives in favour of the expected long-term 
benefits of staying with existing partners, and (3) view potentially high-risk 
actions as being prudent because of the belief that their partners will not act 
opportunistically. Therefore, it is predicted that high levels of trust by both 
millers and cane growers in their relationship will result in commitment by 
both parties. 
 
3.4 Influence by partner 
The influence of one partner over the other in a relationship occurs when one 
partner hierarchically determines and applies rules that will govern 
interaction between partners. Jarratt and Morrison (2001) argue that 
controlling behaviour implied through contractual agreements can be 
mitigated through the introduction of relational practises such as 
collaboration, constructive conflict resolution, and restraint from opportunism.  
Collaborative practises would involve data exchanges, information flows 
(Mohr  et al., 1996) and other measures of relational norms (flexibility and 
solidarity).  Where controlling behaviour exists, there is likelihood that the Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
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controlled partner would perceive an inequitable distribution of relationship 
outcomes, which negatively influence the perception of the relationship.   




Certainty in decision-making refers to the extent to which a partner (1) has 
enough information to make key decisions, (2) can predict the consequences of 
those decisions, and (3) has confidence in those decisions (Achrol and Stern, 
1988). Certainty is defined as the ability to predict changes in relevant factors 
surrounding the exchange between a buyer and a seller.  Walker and Weber 
(1984) argue that environmental uncertainty increases different expectations 
and goals about future supply requirements.  Consequently, the buyer and the 
seller would likely desire a different contract term. For instance, if a farmer is 
unable to accurately forecast the price of his product inputs, he would be 
reluctant to enter into a contract that would lock him into a fixed price for an 
extended period of time. Instead, he would prefer negotiation of the 
agreements that address this price uncertainty and allow for periodic price 
adjustments.  Similarly, the inability of the miller to predict the demand of his 
end products (sugar) would make him hesitant to commit to purchase a 
specified quantity of sugarcane. Therefore, the presence of uncertainty would 
make it difficult for the miller and the farmer to negotiate their contract.  It is 
therefore expected that trust and cooperation reduce decision-making 
uncertainty but promotes certainty, and certainty in turn increases their 
relationship satisfaction.  
 
3.6 Trust, commitment, cooperation and satisfaction 
The relationship between trust, commitment, cooperation and satisfaction in 
relational contracts has been described in different ways in the literature. 
Although the existence of a link between the four variables seems obvious in 
the vast majority of the studies, there is limited agreement about which 
variable is an antecedent or a consequence of the others.  
 
It has been demonstrated that there is a link between cooperation and trust. 
Trust is an antecedent of cooperation in industrial relationships (Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1994). Therefore, the greater the level of trust between exchange 
partners, the more likely the cooperation. As a bilateral investment in the 
relationship, cooperation seems to exist in most regular and stable 
relationships and this leads to satisfaction. After a period when satisfaction, 
trust and commitment have developed, the two parties begin to engage in 




advice. Morgan and Hunt (1994) give details of the direct influence of 
commitment on cooperation. To achieve cooperation, a degree of trust is, 
therefore, an essential ingredient. Thus cooperative behaviour reinforces the 
relationship, stability, and regularity of purchases. In this paper satisfaction is 
used as a proxy for performance because it is a sought behavioural outcome 
that measures effectiveness of a relationship and its potential to predict the 
future actions of the millers and cane growers. Therefore, it is posited that 
cane growers’ trust in millers will positively influence their satisfaction in their 
relationship with the millers. 
 
4. Conceptualisation of grower-miller relationship 
 
According to the preceding discussion it is evident that social factors can 
interact in a relational contract and give rise to the structure of the relationship 
between cane growers and millers. Our hypotheses are tested using a 
structural equation model. The model shows satisfaction (by growers and 
millers) as a qualitative measure of performance and is expected to be directly 
influenced by cooperation, influence by partner and certainty, and indirectly 
by opportunistic behaviour, commitment, trust, and relative dependence. 
Cooperation is affected by relative dependence between growers and millers 
as well as opportunistic behaviour by either party, and the level of trust and 
commitment. The argument is that if commitment in the relationship is high 
on both sides, cooperation should be good, and will ensure satisfactory 
performance of the supply chain. The same argument holds for the level of 
trust (which also has influence on commitment), which will strengthen good 
cooperation. Opportunistic behaviour on the other hand will negatively 
impact on the future cooperation and it is hypothesised that it will carry a 
negative coefficient. It is also hypothesised that commitment to the success 
and sustainability of the contractual relationship will be negatively influenced 
by opportunistic behaviour by either millers or growers and positively 
influenced by trust in each other by both players. The level of certainty 
between the millers and cane growers is positively influenced by the level of 
cooperation and the level of trust. When the relationship of millers and cane 
growers is characterised by high levels of cooperation and trust on both sides, 
the level of risks are expected to be reduced, hence both players will be certain 
since they will share valuable information. Since literature has shown that the 
level of trust in a relationship decrease with an increase in manifestation of 
opportunistic behaviour, it is argued therefore, that the presence of 
opportunistic behaviour by millers and cane growers would have a negative 
impact on the level of trust in each other. Finally, when one partner is more Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
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dependent on the other, the less dependent partner is likely to influence the 
more dependent partner in the relationship. 
 
The performance of supply chains may be explained by various factors and 
the inter-relationship of these factors are varied, hence such relationship may 
not be tested in a single study. However, control variables are proposed and 
these include a covariation between trust and cooperation as well as a direct 
relationship between trust and satisfaction. These relationships are 
summarised in the following equations:  
1. COOP = b1RDEP - b2OPP + b3TRUST + b4COMIT + e1 
2. COMIT = b1OPP - b2TRUST + e2 
3. CERT = b1TRUST + b2COOP + e3 
4. SAT = b1CERT + b2COOP + b3INF + e4 
5. TRUST = b1OPP + e5 
6. INF = b1RDEP + e6 
Where: 
 COOP = Growers’ perceived cooperation (F4); RDEP = Relative dependence 
(F1); TRUST = Growers’ trust in the millers (F3); COMIT = Growers’ 
commitment in their exchange relationship with millers (F8); CERT =Growers’ 
certainty about their relationship with millers (F7); SAT = Growers’ 
satisfaction in their relationship with millers (F5); INF = Growers’ perception 
of influence by millers (F2); and OPP = Opportunistic behaviour (F6) 
5. Data and methods 
The empirical analysis was based on data gathered from 124 smallholder cane 
growers in the sugar industry in Swaziland. A purposive sampling method 
was utilised to gather the sample of farmers. Personal interviews were 
conducted during the period of May to December 2001 using a questionnaire 
(Appendix 1) with a standardised 4 point likert scale, ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree and very much dissatisfied to very much satisfied 
for items measuring satisfaction. 
 
Data were checked to verify that the assumptions of multivariate normality 
were not violated and the internal consistence was measured using 
Cronbach’s alpha. Construct validity was assessed by analysing convergent 
and discriminant validity. Due to the limited sample size and the requirement 
of at least 5 observations per estimate parameter, partial aggregation of 
indicator variables was used. This was done by aggregation of items with the 
highest reliabilities with those with lowest reliabilities.  




In this study structural equation modelling was used because of the 
advantages it has over other types of multivariate techniques namely; (1) it 
provides a straightforward method of dealing with multiple relationships 
simultaneously, whilst providing statistical efficiency, and (2) it has an ability 
to assess the relationships comprehensively and provides a transition from 
exploratory to confirmatory analysis (Bollen, 1989; Hair et al., 1998).  
 
6. Results and discussion 
 
6.1 Construct Measurement 
 
The measurement model describes the relationships between the latent 
(unobserved) factors and their indicator variables. Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) was used to test the adequacy of the measurement model as a 
prerequisite in structural models. CFA enables the researcher to test if 
conjectured relationship structures are supported by the observed data. Table 
1 presents the measurement properties for aggregated indicator variables. The 
results suggest that the hypothesised relationship is supported by the data. 
 
The overall model consists of eight factors: opportunistic behaviour, relative 
dependence, commitment, trust, cooperation, influence by partner, certainty 
and satisfaction. Each of these constructs was measured by indicator variables, 
which were later aggregated into two or three manifest indicator variables.  
Table 1 shows the standardised pattern of coefficients, the t-statistics and the 
constructs reliabilities useful in assessing the quality of the measurement 
model. All the indicator variables loaded significantly at the 5% level to their 
respective constructs with the exception of those indicator variables measuring 
certainty and commitment, which were significant at the 10% level.  
 
The results also indicate that cane growers are certain about, and are 
committed to their relationship with millers. However, they perceive poor 
cooperation between themselves and the millers. This is further evidenced by 
their perception of the practice of opportunistic behaviour by millers. For 
example, some farmers claim sugar mills charge them money to cover costs of 
making white sugar from brown sugar, while such deductions are not done 
for all the farmers. Further, farmers argue that they are being cheated by 
millers because they are paying them only on the basis of sucrose extracted 
from the sugarcane they had delivered, instead of incorporating payment for 
molasses and baggasse, which the millers use as a source of fuel. Despite the 
farmers’ perception of opportunistic behaviour by millers and their perceived 
dependence on the millers, cane growers are satisfied with their relationship 
and still trust the millers to a limited extend. Cane growers feel they are Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
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dependent on the millers and this dependence is caused by the fact that 
farmers are locked into the mill that is nearer to them because it would be 
uneconomic for them to change to another mill as they would incur high 
transport costs because of long distances.  
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0.67083 2.914  0.476 
Mag1 (V19) 










































0.52617 2.853  0.585 
Note: * refers to squared multiple correlation 
Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree;3= Agree; 4=Strongly Disagree 
Note:  V1-V20 refers to aggregated indicator variables that measure the different constructs in the model. 
 
Table 2 presents the fit indices for the confirmatory factor analysis of the 
aggregated manifest variables. The χ2 fit statistics is 324.49 with degrees of 
freedom of 142 (p<0.001), while the root mean squared error of approximation 
(RMSEA) is 0. 10. The root mean squared residual (RMSR) represents the 
average discrepancy between the observed sample and proposed variance-
covariance matrices and is an indicator of a well fitting model. The results 
show a RMSR of 0.09, which is slightly greater than the recommended upper 
cutting point of 0.08 for a good model. The goodness of fit index (GFI) is 0.806 
and the ratio of χ2/df is 2.29. Generally, GFI and AGFI scores ranging from 
0.80 to 0.89 are interpreted as representing reasonable fit while scores of 0.90 
and above represent a good fit model (Doll, et al., 1995). The ratio of the χ2/df 
should not be more than 3.  Based on these indices the model is moderately 
acceptable. This suggests that the proposed model of the relationship between 
smallholder cane growers and millers fits the data. 




6.2 Structural equation modelling 
Figure 1 presents the theoretical structural model and the measurement model 
that was tested. The figure shows that “relative dependence” (F1), is measured 
by manifest variables V1 and V2, while the “influence by partner” (F2) is 

























F1 = Relative dependence       F5 = Grower’s satisfaction 
F2 = Influence by partner       F6 = Opportunistic behaviour 
F3 = Grower’s trust       F7 = Grower’s certainty 
F4 = Grower’s perceived cooperation   F8 = Grower’s commitment 
Note: V1 to V20 refers to aggregated indicator variables that measure the different constructs in the model. 
Figure 1:  Proposed  theoretical  model of cane growers and the millers’ 
relationship 
 
The overall model was inspected for “offending estimates”, which could be in 
the form of estimates that exceed acceptable limits in the measurement and 
structural models and further examined if the latter is adequately represented 
by the data. The squared multiple correlations (r2) were used as the reliability 
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shown in Table 1 indicate that the indicator variables are moderately strong. 
Due to sensitivity of structural equation modes (SEM) in terms of sample size 
and the number of observations per parameter to be estimated, the proposed 
model was then reduced by splitting it into three sub models since the sample 
size was not large enough to cater for all the variables in the model. Figure 2 
shows the split of the three sub-models. Splitting the model into sub-models 





























Figure 2: Sub-models 1, 2, and 3 of proposed model of cane growers and 
millers’ relationship 
 
The results of the three sub-models are shown in Table 2. The results show 
that all three sub-models had an average fit. The RMSEA is about 0.1, which 
meets the acceptable level for an average model fit to the data. Although the 
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 SUB MODEL 3 
 




sub-models. The GFI is above 0.80. The ratio of chi-square to degrees of 
freedom is also relatively acceptable, though for sub-model one it is slightly 
more than the recommended ratio of 3:1.  
 
Table 2a:  Absolute goodness of fit indices for the various models 
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Note: N = 124. GFI = Goodness of fit index; RMSR= Root Mean Square Residual;  
RMSEA = Root Mean Square of Approximation 
 
Table 2b:  Incremental goodness of fit indices for the various models 
Model AGFI  CFI  NFI  NNFI 
Null Model:  
               1. 
               2. 
               3. 
     
Model: 
Full model. 
               1. 
               2. 





















Note: N = 124. AGFI = Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit index; 
NFI = Normed Fit Index; NNFI = Nonnormed Fit Index.  
 
Table 3 shows only the results with significant relationship. The results for 
sub-model one indicate that cane growers’ perception of opportunistic 
behaviour by millers is negatively related to cane growers’ trust and 
commitment to their relationship with millers. A significant positive 
relationship was found between commitment and cooperation. The results 
also show that for sub model 2 there is a positive significant relationship 
between cane growers’ trust in millers and perceived cooperation. The 
relationship between trust and cooperation suggest that trust lead to Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
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cooperation and cooperation may further promote trust between millers and 
the cane growers.  
 
As expected, cane growers’ perception of cooperation is positive and 
significantly related to the cane growers’ certainty in their relationship with 
millers as well as the cane growers’ satisfaction with the relationship. The 
results suggest that when the cane growers perceive good cooperation 
between themselves and the millers, they are likely to perceive satisfaction 
with the relationship. 
 
The results for sub-model 3 indicate that cane growers’ relative dependence on 
millers has a significant positive relationship to their perception of 
cooperation. Unexpectedly the results show a significant negative relationship 
between the cane growers’ relative dependence and influence by millers. This 
could be due to the fact that, cane growers are locked into the relationship by 
high switching costs (mainly related to large distances they have to travel to 
deliver cane to an alternative miller). Hence they do not consider the millers’ 
influence as important. Cane growers’ trust in millers has a positive and 
significant relationship with their perception of cooperation by millers. 
Table 3:  Structural parameters  
Sub-model 1  Parameter  Estimate  Std Error  t-stat 
  F3-F8  0.5834 0.4281 1.3628 
 F6-F8  -0.8031  0.3443  -2.3326 
 F6-F3  -0.7121  0.0845  -8.4278 
  F3-F4  0.3820 0.2842 1.3441 
 F6-F4  -0.3290  0.2280  -1.4430 
  F8-F4  0.0004 0.0003 1.6838 
Sub-model  2       
 F3-F7  -0.2677  0.1840  -1.1830 
  F3-F5  0.4201 0.0810 5.0290 
  F4-F7  0.0565 0.1906 2.0565 
  F2-F5  0.0362 0.0682 0.5313 
  F4-F5  0.6717 0.0878 7.6473 
 F7-F5  -0.0108  0.0830  -0.1303 
  Cov:  F3F4  0.7776 0.0545 14.27 
Sub-model  3       
  F3-F4  0.3984 0.0675 5.9004 
  F1-F4  0.6779 0.0817 8.2956 
 F1-F2  -0.4883  0.0931  -5.2441 
  F2-F5  0.0618 0.0933 0.6619 
  F4-F5  0.7513 0.1322 5.6827 
 
Table 4 presents the structural parameters and the squared multiple 




model one 78% of the variance in trust is explained by the cane growers’ 
perception of opportunistic behaviour, while 62% of the variation in 
cooperation is explained by commitment and 0.08% of the variation in 
commitment is explained by the cane growers’ perception of opportunistic 
behaviour by millers. Cane growers expressed a concern about the practice of 
opportunistic behaviour by millers, for example; during the interview 
discussions, some farmers stated that they want to be paid for all the products 
derived from sugarcane, including bagasse, molasses and compost.  Others 
revealed that millers have a tendency to test the sucrose content of their cane 
whilst it is still in the field and if the sucrose content is low, they postpone 
harvesting until the sucrose content is high. In contrast the sucrose content for 
cane growers’ cane is tested at the mill and if low, the farmers loose out 
financially since payment is based on sucrose content in the cane. 
 
The results reveal that 81% of the variation in the cane growers’ satisfaction 
with their relationship with millers is explained by their perception on 
cooperation between themselves and the millers and the trust farmers have in 
the millers. The results further show that perceived cooperation explains about 
0.8% of the variations in certainty. The results further show that 94% of the 
variation in the cane growers’ perception of influence by partner is explained 
by the cane growers’ perception of relative dependence on the millers, 
whereas 30% of the cane growers’ perception of cooperation between 
themselves and the millers is explained by the cane growers’ trust in millers 
and their relative dependence on millers.  
Table 4:  Squared Multiple Correlations  
Sub-model 1  Variables  Error Variance Total  Variance  R-squared 
 Growers’  trust  (F3)  0.1449  0.6519  0.7777 
 Cooperation  (F4)  0.2353  0.6178  0.6191 
  Growers’ commitment (F8)  236.0768  236.2765  0.0008 
Sub-model 2         
 Satisfaction  (F5)  0.1078  0.5586  0.8069 
 Certainty  (F7)  8.0175  8.0797  0.0077 
Sub-model 3         
  Influence by partner (F2)  0.0373  0.6556  0.9431 
 F4  0.5515  0.7899  0.3018 
 F5  0.0728  0.4152  0.8246 
 
6.3 Total and indirect effects of exogenous variables on endogenous 
variables 
Empirical analysis of links between constructs can be examined in two ways, 
the direct and total effects. The direct effects are the influences of one variable 
on another that are not mediated by any other variable. The test of the direct 
effects provides a more straightforward way of assessing whether the data Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
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supports the proposed relationships between two constructs. Indirect effects 
are those that are mediated by at least one other variable. Total effects are the 
sum of the direct and indirect effects. It is a more comprehensive indication of 
the influence of one construct on another. Table 5 presents the direct, indirect 
and total effects of each construct.  
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* = direct effect from sub model 2 
** = direct effect from sub model 3 
*** = Total effect (average of the sub model 2 and 3 direct effects) 
 
Although relative dependence has no direct effect on satisfaction, the results in 
Table 5 indicate that it has a significant positive indirect influence on cane 
growers’ perception of cooperation, but a negative impact on influence by 
partner. Therefore, relative dependence has a positive significant relationship 
with cane growers’ satisfaction both direct and indirect via cooperation. Trust 
is regarded as an important element influencing cooperation and satisfaction 
in relationships and as indispensable asset in successful relationships. The 
results show that trust is important in the smallholder cane growers’ 




cooperation, trust has a positive significant influence on cane growers’ 
satisfaction with their relationship with millers. The results also show that 
cane growers’ perception of opportunistic behaviour by millers have 
significant negative impact on the cane growers’ satisfaction via trust and their 
perception of cooperation. 
 
The results also indicate that commitment is important in exchange 
relationship since it has a significant positive impact on cooperation and 
through cooperation it also positively influences the cane growers’ satisfaction 
in their relationship with millers.  
8. CONCLUSION 
The organisational literature has always posited that relational factors, such as 
trust, cooperation, commitment and absence of opportunistic behaviour play a 
key role in economic exchange, particularly when one or another party is 
subjected to the risk of opportunistic behaviour and incomplete monitoring, or 
when moral hazard problems arise. The results of this study confirm that the 
perception of cooperation has a direct influence on satisfaction, while trust, 
commitment, relative dependence, and perceived opportunistic behaviour 
have an indirect influence on satisfaction through cooperation.  
 
This study has found that, farmers perceive some elements of manifestation of 
opportunistic behaviour and lack of cooperation by millers and therefore have 
limited trust in the millers.  Based on the findings of this study, therefore there 
is a need by the SSA to consider new ways of explaining its functions and 
activities to the public and the smallholder farmers. For example the 
advertisement referring to sugar  “the real Swazi Gold” seems to have caused 
a lot of misunderstanding and may have given the impression that the 
industry is extremely lucrative. Hence, the perception by smallholder farmers 
that they are being cheated by millers. The Swaziland Government also needs 
to strengthen its extension service provided to the cane growers in terms of 
skills and number since there are currently only two Government extension 
officers responsible for all the smallholder farmers. This will enable the officers 
to be effective and efficient providing advise to the farmers and explaining 
how the industry operates, since farmers regard them as neutral persons 
compared to those provided by the SSA. This will improve the relationship 
between cane growers and the millers and avoid future conflict, which could 
hamper the efficient functioning of the supply chain. Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
 
 




Achrol R & Stern L (1988). Environmental determinants of decision-making 
uncertainty in marketing channels. Journal of Marketing Research, 25 (Feb): 36-
50. 
 
Anderson, E. and Narus, J. A. (1990). A model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer 
Firm Working Partnerships. Journal of Marketing,  54 (1),  42-58  
 
Anderson E & Weitz BA (1989). Determinants of continuity in conventional 
industrial channel dyads. Marketing Science, 8 (Fall), 310-323. 
 
Bollen KA (1989). Structural Equations with Latent Variables. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
 
Doll WJ, Raghunathan TS, Lim JS & Gupta YP (1995). A confirmatory factor 
analysis of the user information satisfaction instrument. Information Systems 
Research, 6 (2), 177-189. 
 
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, P. (1997). An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer-
Seller Relationships,. Journal of Marketing, 61 (2), 35-51. 
 
Emerson RM (1962). Power-dependence relations. American Sociological 
Review, 27 (February), 31-41. 
 
Gulati R (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties 
for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38 (1), 
85-112. 
 
Hair JF, Anderson RE, Tatham RL & Black WC (1998).  Multivariate data 
analysis (5th ed), NJ: .Prentice Hall, Inc.  
 
Jarratt D & Morrison M  (2001). Dependence in major business relationships. 
Working paper No. 9/01. School of marketing and management, Charles Sturt 
University, Bathurst 
 
Mohr JJ, Fisher R & Nevin JR (1996). Collaborative communication in 
interfirm relationships: Moderating effects of integration and control. Journal of 
Marketing, 60 (3): 103-117. 




Moorman C, Zaltman G & Deshpande R (1992). Relationships between 
providers and users of market research: The dynamics of trust within and 
between organizations. Journal of Marketing Research 29 (3) (August), 314-329. 
 
Morgan R.M. and Hunt S.D (1994). The Commitment-Trust Theory of 
Relationship Marketing. Journal of Marketing  58 (3) (July) 20-38. 
 
Oliver C (1990). Determinants interorganizational relationships: Integration 
and future directions. Academy of Management Review 15(2), 241-265. 
 
Ring PS & Van de Ven AH (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative 
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review 19 (1), 90-118. 
 
Smith KG, Carroll SJ & Ashford SJ (1995). Intra-and interorganizational 
cooperation: Toward a research agenda. Academy of Management Journal 38 (1), 
7-23. 
 
Sugar Act (1967). Swaziland Sugar Industry Act. Mbabane, Swaziland. 
 
Thompson C F (2005).  Swaziland Business Year Book, 2005. Website: 
www.swazibusiness.com/ 30/05/05 
 
UNCTAD (2000). Policies for small-scale sugar cane growing in Swaziland. 
Report prepared for United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) under project SWA/99/A06. 
 
Walker G & Weber D (1984). A transaction cost approach to make-or-buy 
decisions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29: 373-391. 
 
Wilkinson IF & Young LC (1989). The role of trust and co-operation in 











 Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March  2007)  Masuku, Kirsten & Owen 
 
 
  114 
Appendix 1 
Questionnaire for Smallholder cane growers 
 
 
Items measuring satisfaction         Items measuring commitment 
1. Price paid for sugarcane (satis1) 
2. Procedures for testing sucrose content 
(satis2) 
3. Time taken to pay after sugarcane has 
been delivered to the mill (satis3) 
4. Technical assistance provided by the 
sugar association (satis4) 
1. Given a chance you would change to and 
supply another mill (comit1) (R) 
2. You have invested a lot of capital in the 
sugarcane business (comit2) 
3. You honour your quota as required by the 
mill (comit3). 
4. You always try to satisfy your quota 
(comit4) 
5. You do not care whether you meet your 
quota, as long as you make profit (comit5) 
(R) 
 
Items measuring influence by partner       Items measuring certainty 
1. The mill tries to control farmers (influby1) 
2. Farmers can make farming decisions 
independently of the mill (influby2) (R) 
3. Farmers take whatever the mill says 
because they do not have any bargaining 
power (influby3) 
4. The mill has more bargaining power than 
farmers (influby4) 
5. Farmers manage to have their concerns 
considered by the mill (Rinflov1) (R) 
6. Farmers can influence the price of 
sugarcane offered in the industry (Rinflov2) 
(R) 
7. Farmers and the mill have equal 
bargaining power (Rinflov3) (R) 
8. Farmers have more bargaining power 
than the mill (Rinflov4) (R) 
1. Farmers are assured of a market (cert1) 
2. Farmers know in advance the price at 
which the sugarcane will be bought (cert2) 
3. Farmers have all the technical know how 
on growing sugarcane (cert3) 
4. Farmers can always get technical 
information from the SSA Extension 
department (cert4) 












Items measuring opportunistic behaviour    Items measuring relative dependence 
1. The mill takes advantage of the farmers 
ignorance (opp1) 
2. The miller is concerned with maximizing 
its own profits (opp2) 
3. The mill cheats when testing cane 
growers’ sugarcane (opp3) 
4. The difference in opinion between the 
mill and farmers is what strengthen the 
relationship between the two parties 
(Rconf1) (R). 
5. The differences in opinions between the 
mill and farmers is an effort by the mill to 
cheat farmers (conf2) 
6. Farmers regard conflict of opinion 
between the mill and farmers as way of 
doing business (Rconf3) (R) 
1. If you want you can switch from growing 
sugarcane to another enterprise (dep1) 
2. If this mill could close down, you would be 
forced to go out of business (dep2) 
3. The mill makes an effort to assist farmers 
during emergencies (e.g. providing transport) 
(dep3) 
4. Farmers can sell their sugarcane only to this 
mill (dep11) 
5. The mill’s output can be lowered without 
the cane growers’ involvement in sugarcane 
production (dep22R) R 
6. Farmers can still do better by engaging in 
other business than sugarcane production 
(dep33R) R 
7. Farmers are visited by the industry’s 
extension agents on frequent basis (dep7) 
8. Farmers are invited to workshops by the 
SSA (dep8) 
 
R= reversed coding 
 
Items measuring trust           Items measuring cooperation 
1. The mill’s decisions are meant to benefit 
both growers and the mill (trust1) 
2. The mill treats cane growers with care 
(trust2) 
3. There is a mutual understanding between 
the mill and the cane growers (trust3) 
4 .  T h e  m i l l  c a n  b e  r e l i e d  u p o n  f o r  i t s  
technical ability (trust4) 
5. The mill sometimes withhold some 
information that may be useful to us cane 
growers (trust5R) (R) 
6. The miller cheats on farmers (trust6R) (R) 
7. One has to monitor and double check 
whatever information the miller gives (R) 
8. You sometimes think of quitting 
sugarcane farming (Rpleave1) (R) 
9. The way farmers are treated by the mill 
one thinks of changing the mill (Rpleave2) 
(R) 
1. Your activities with the mill are well 
coordinated (coop1) 
2 .  T o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  m i l l  y o u  p l a n  
productions and delivery schedules (coop2) 
3. The mill seriously take into consideration 
farmers concerns (coop3) 
4. The mill seeks cane growers’ opinions 
whenever it considers implementing changes 
that will affect farmers as well (coop4) 
5. The mill is very much cooperative (coop5) 
6. There are no hassles looking for a market 
(Benefit 2) 
7. Subsidized transport by the mill (Benefit 3) 
8. Loans provided by the mill to farmers 
(Benefit 4) 
9. Use of mill equipment by farmers (Benefit 
5) 
R= reversed coding     
 
 
 